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Abstract 
This note considers Hotelling’s (1929) model of locational choices by two firms and 
subsequent price competition in a setting where atomistic consumers locate first.  It is 
shown that any equilibrium in pure strategies involves either one or two mass points 
with all surplus captured either by the consumers or by firms, respectively.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Harold Hotelling’s 1929 classic “Stability in competition” has spawned an extensive 
literature on firms’ locational choices, both spatial and otherwise.  Hotelling himself 
suggested that two firms locating along a line segment populated by a uniform 
distribution of consumers would have an incentive to locate together – the principle of 
minimal differentiation – and this ‘equilibrium’ is often cited to explain the clustering 
of firms.1  This conjecture is correct if firms’ only choices are locations i.e. if prices 
are fixed, as firms’ locational decisions are then driven by maximizing market share 
alone, given that there is no price competition, and any location of a rival is best met 
by moving in closer to them. 
 When the game is enriched by adding price competition, however, things 
change dramatically.  Suppose that firms first (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) 
choose locations and subsequently (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) choose 
prices.   If transport costs (disutility) are sufficiently convex2 in distance – say 
quadratic – then there is a pure strategy equilibrium to the price game for every pair of 
locations, but the optimal locations are as far from each other as possible3: the 
principle of maximal differentiation.  Essentially firms now recognize that closer 
locations lead to more intense price competition in the next stage of the game. 
                                                 
1 “Clustering” here refers not just to locations in physical space.  Hotelling himself suggested that the, 
“tremendous standardisation of our furniture, our houses, our clothing, our automobiles and our 
education are due in part to the economies of large-scale production, in part to fashion and imitation.  
But over and above these forces is…the tendency to make only slight deviations in order to have for the 
new commodity as many buyers of the old as possible, to get, so to speak, between one’s competitors 
and a mass of customers.” (Hotelling, 1929 p.54.)  
2  See Economides (1986). 
3 This is true so long as each consumer’s reservation price is ‘sufficiently’ high.  Under the Hotelling 
assumption of transport costs linear in distance it has been shown (see d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1979))) that there is no pure strategy equilibrium to the price-setting game if firms locations are 
‘too close’ – roughly, each firm’s best response to the other’s ‘optimal’ price is either to undercut it and 
capture the entire market or to charge a higher price and settle for a smaller market share.  Osborne and 
Pitchik (1987) identify mixed-strategy equilibria to the price game for some locations where there is no 
pure strategy price equilibrium. 
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 As a guiding principle for firms’ locational decisions the principle of maximal 
differentiation is, of course, subject to a number of caveats.  In particular, an 
offsetting desideratum is to “be where the demand is”: if consumers were to be 
clustered at certain points rather than uniformly distributed this would naturally 
mitigate incentives for maximal differentiation. 
 This is the starting point for the present short paper, along with the following 
observation.  In the two-stage game just considered, consumer welfare is minimised, 
across the set of symmetric locations, with maximal differentiation – aggregate 
transport costs are the same as with minimal differentiation but firms’ prices are 
increasing in their spatial separation.  If consumers could choose their locations, one 
might then anticipate that the maximal differentiation result would collapse.  In this 
paper we take the two-stage version of Hotelling but add an extra stage at the 
beginning in which atomistic consumers choose their locations optimally.  Our 
conjecture is that this will re-establish minimal differentiation, even for non-strategic 
atomistic consumers, as they will cluster thus inducing the firms to locate more 
closely and hence to engage in fiercer price competition, to the consumers’ benefit.   
We demonstrate that this intuition is borne out, at least in the sense that there exists an 
equilibrium in which it holds.  While we make the argument in the context of a two 
firm model, it will be clear that it applies, mutatis mutandis, to the n firm case.  
 
2.  The Model 
 For reasons that we explain below, whether transport costs are quadratic or linear 
makes no difference at all here so we shall take the simplest case of linear transport 
costs.  So consider a line segment of unit length along which atomistic consumers 
individually choose to locate, where locations are indexed on the interval [0,1].  The 
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density of consumers is L.  Once they have committed to locations, two firms then 
each choose a location and, following that, compete in prices for their identical 
products.  Each consumer is willing to pay a reservation price of v for a single unit of 
the good in question and will incur a transport cost of t for every unit of distance they 
travel to a vendor.  So a consumer travelling a distance si to purchase at money price 
pi from vendor i would derive utility of v-tsi-pi where we shall refer to tsi+pi as the full 
price of the good to the consumer – the money price plus transport costs. We 
normalise each firm’s costs to zero.  We assume, by way of a tie-breaker, that, if a 
consumer is exactly indifferent between purchasing from the two firms, they will 
purchase from the closer of the two; only if the firms are the same distance and set the 
same price will they share the market equally.  We seek a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies at each stage.4  Accordingly, we wish to solve the game 
backwards, but it turns out to be sensible to first consider stage one of the game. 
 
Stage One: the consumers’ locational decisions  
We suppose, as in the standard Hotelling framework, that consumers are atomistic.  
Accordingly, each consumer alone can do nothing to influence firms’ locations, given 
the locations of all other consumers.  We are interested in a non-cooperative outcome 
so we do not consider collusive behaviour by consumers.  We make the following 
claim: 
 
Proposition One: in a 2-firm setting, the equilibrium distribution of consumers will 
consist of (at most) 2 distinct mass points.   
 
                                                 
4 The results of Osborne and Pitchik (1987) suggest that this may be a considerable restriction – we 
show later that many locational choices lead to non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the price-
setting subgame but their results indicate that mixed strategy equilibria are likely to exist in many of 
these cases.  We do not consider such equilibria henceforth.   
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To see this, suppose the Proposition was incorrect and we had some equilibrium to the 
full game in which some consumers were not located at the same point as a firm 
(which would be the case whatever locations the two firms actually chose if the claim 
were incorrect.)  Consider one of these consumers. They could not then have chosen 
locations optimally initially – choosing to locate where the nearest firm locates would 
have no effect on the firms’ choices (either in terms of locations or prices), as each 
consumer is atomistic, but would reduce the consumer’s transport costs and thus raise 
their welfare. 
 
Stage Three: the firms’ pricing decisions 
By Proposition One we know that, in the case of two firms, consumers will be massed 
in either one or two mass points.  As a consequence there is a potential new reason for 
non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the firms’ price-setting game.  To see 
this, suppose there are two mass points of consumers and suppose initially that they 
are equal (½L).  Figure One illustrates the nature of competition here.  Suppose the 
consumers are massed at points c1 and c2 and the two firms are located at f1 and f2.5  
We portray the density at each mass point by the height of each thick line, measured 
off the right-hand axis.  If each firm chooses its price so as to maximise profits from 
its closest consumer group only, they will price at p1* and p2* respectively, measured 
on the left-hand axis, where these are chosen so that all consumers face a price, 
including transport costs, that leaves them zero surplus. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Throughout the paper we set the location notation so that 2 is to the right of 1, whether we are 
considering firms or consumers.  We also refer occasionally to a firm selling to its own consumers; by 
this we mean the firm at fi selling to consumers located at ci. 
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Figure One 
 
Clearly these optimal prices are pi*=v-tsii, i=1,2, where sij=|fi-cj| denotes the distance 
from firm i to consumer mass point j.  Profits are then ½Lpi*=½L(v-tsii) and both 
firms would prefer to locate at the consumer mass points, thus reducing sii to zero. 
 However, if firms’ locations were closer firm i could capture the entire market 
by charging a price that just undercuts firm j at consumer mass point j. This requires a 
price infinitesimally less than pi′=v-tsij thus yielding profits of πi′=Lpi′ which exceeds 
½L(v-tsii) if v≥t(2sij-sii).  If this latter condition is satisfied then the possibility arises of 
there being no pure strategy equilibrium in the price game, for the same reason as in 
the standard Hotelling case: each firm’s profit function is discontinuous at the price at 
which it takes the entire market.   
While similar to the Hotelling non-existence problem note that, in contrast, 
quadratic transport costs would not avoid the non-existence problem here6 as the 
discrete nature of the consumers’ distribution would still give a discontinuity at that 
                                                 
6 See d’Aspremont et al (1979) for a discussion of this in the Hotelling case.   
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critical price.7  Consequently, there are a number of cases in which no pure-strategy 
equilibrium exists in the price-setting subgame, depending on the proximity of the 
consumers’ mass points, the proximity of firms and the distribution of consumers 
across the two mass points.8  Where an equilibrium does exist for the case of two 
distinct mass points, it is one of two types: either each firm serves only consumers at 
its closest mass point and charges a price that extracts all their surplus, or firm i 
charges a price of zero, firm j a positive price and firm i sells nothing for zero profit 
while firm j makes a positive profit capturing the entire market.  In the case of a single 
mass point of consumers, the only equilibrium is that the most distant firm charges a 
money price of zero and sells nothing, the closest firm sets a money price such that 
the full price equals that of the distant firm and captures the entire market.  If both 
firms locate equidistantly from the mass point (including a distance of zero), however, 
both set zero prices and share the market. 
 
Stage Two: the firms’ location decisions 
In stage two, firms are aware of the consequences of their locational choices for 
subsequent price competition.  As we seek a pure-strategy equilibrium, we confine 
our attention to those locational choices that yield a pure-strategy equilibrium in the 
third stage and, as noted, these are of two kinds when there are two distinct mass 
points of consumers.  In the first, where each firm serves only consumers at its closest 
mass point and charges the price pi* that extracts all their surplus, a profit-maximising 
                                                 
7 In the usual case with a given continuous distribution of consumers, a small reduction in price can 
yield a discontinuity in a firm’s profit function when costs are linear, as the other firm is undercut in 
every location, but not when they are quadratic.  Here, even with quadratic costs, a firm’s profit 
function will be discontinuous for a small price cut when it erodes the other firm’s market because 
there is only a single location for each firm’s consumers so undercutting there is effectively 
undercutting at every location, just as in the standard Hotelling with linear costs.   
8 The Appendix details the conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium does exist for different 
locational choices.   
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firm will find it pays to move closer to those consumers (so long as it is not then 
tempted to serve the other mass point as well.9)  This enables the firm to capture 
surplus otherwise dissipated as transport costs: pi*=v-tsii, i=1,2, yielding profits of 
πi=Li(v-tsii) where Li denotes the mass of consumers at ci.  Reducing sii thus increases 
the money price that can be charged and hence raises profits.  
 The second type of price equilibrium occurs when both firms lie to the same 
side of both consumer locations (or one firm is so distant from all consumers that the 
other firm can capture the whole market even when the distant firm charges a zero 
money price.)  For example, suppose f1<f2<c1<c2.  Now firm 2 is closer to all 
consumers than is firm 1 and firm 1 will make zero profit if it does not undercut any 
p2.  Accordingly, the only equilibrium is that p1=0 and firm 2 sets either the identical 
full price, p2=t(s11-s21) or, if f1 is sufficiently distant (if s11>v/t), then either p2=v-ts22 
(if the full market is served) or p2=v-ts21 if firm 2 serves only its own consumers 
(which will occur if c1 and c2 are sufficiently far apart.)  Thus π1=0 and π2=Lt(s11-s21) 
or π2=max{L(v-ts22), L1(v-ts21)}.  In such a case firm 1’s location is clearly not 
optimal: given f2 firm 1 would do better to locate such that f1=f2+ε or at f1=c2 if that 
yielded local monopolies and higher profit.  The same is true when firm i is distant 
and sets pi=0 in the price equilibrium.  In sum, this second type of price equilibrium 
cannot be supported as an equilibrium in location choices. 
 Finally, if all consumers have the same single location then only the closest 
firm makes positive profits; accordingly, the only equilibrium locations are for both 
firms to locate exactly at the consumer mass point.10   
                                                 
9 That is, if the firms move too close together they will enter the locations in which there is no 
equilibrium in the subsequent price-setting subgame.   
10 Technically, this requires a further ‘tie-breaker’ assumption that a firm with a number of alternative 
locations all yielding zero profit chooses the one that maximises its sales.  Otherwise a single firm at 
the mass point could capture the entire market with price v and the other firm, not at c, would make 
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Stage One: the consumers’ location decisions revisited 
So far we have established equilibria in the location-choice stage that yield equilibria 
in the price-setting subgame.  However, the initial locational choices of consumers 
further restrict the locational choices of firms that might be equilibria.  Suppose that c1 
and c2 are sufficiently close together that fi=ci would yield no equilibrium in the price-
setting game.  Nevertheless, if the firms located such that moving any closer would 
induce non-equilibrium, then we have an equilibrium for the location-choice 
subgame: for each firm, given the location of the other firm, there is no location that 
yields greater profits. 
 However, this configuration also cannot be an equilibrium to the entire game 
as it involves non-optimal location choices by consumers.  As noted earlier, each 
atomistic consumer here would be better relocating to one of the firms’ locations.   
Letting ∆ denote the distance between two consumer mass points (i.e. ∆=c2-
c1) and noting that when each firm locates at its own consumers’ location sii=0 and 
sji=∆, we get a pure strategy equilibrium if i
j
L t
L v t
∆< − ∆ .  
 To summarise the forgoing discussion, we have the following Proposition. 
Proposition Two: in a 2- firm setting, any equilibrium in pure strategies to this game 
involves either (i) a single mass point of consumers located at the same point as both 
firms, each of whom charges a zero money price and makes zero profits thus yielding 
surplus of v to all consumers, or (ii) two distinct mass points of consumers with 
                                                                                                                                            
zero profit for any price but would have no reason to move to c, as it will make zero profit there as 
well.  Hence this could be an equilibrium too without this further tie-breaker.   
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i
j
L t
L v t
∆< − ∆  and each firm located at one mass point charging a money price of v and 
making profits of v per consumer served thus yielding zero surplus to consumers.   
 
3.  Discussion and conclusion 
Our initial conjecture – that mobile consumers might lead to the collapse of the 
literature’s maximal differentiation result – has (sort of) been borne out here.  The 
suspicion was that, by locating close together, consumers could induce the firms to 
locate together and thereby price more aggressively, to the consumers’ benefit.  
However, we have shown that there are two sorts of generic equilibria to this game 
and only in one, when all consumers locate at the same point, does this intuition hold 
as the firms will locate there too and charge zero prices.  In the other, where there are 
two mass points of consumers, the firms act as local monopolists and extract all 
surplus from the consumers. 
 There is, of course, an infinite number of equilibria to this game and the usual 
question of selecting amongst this plethora of possibilities arises here.  All of the 
equilibria are efficient – there are no transport costs incurred in any of them – but the 
two broad types (single or double locations) differ in terms of who captures the 
surplus (consumers or firms.)  A simple modification to the game that has some 
appeal is to adjust the first stage so that consumers arrive in sequence.  They are still 
atomistic but they each choose location in turn.  In such a setting the location chosen 
by the first consumer will be ‘focal’ for other consumers and we would observe only a 
single location being chosen by consumers.11   
While we have cast this argument in the context of consumers’ locations in a 
linear city, it might also be argued in the context of city locations in a linear country.   
                                                 
11 This game still has an infinite number of equilibria, however, as any single location on [0,1] will do. 
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In this sense the paper provides a rationale for the existence of cities (a strategic 
rationale, rather than the usual arguments given in the agglomeration literature) as 
well as for observing a high-rise on Hotelling’s Main Street. 
Finally, while we have cast this argument in the setting of only two firms, it is 
reasonably apparent that it will generalise to the case of n firms.  In particular, the 
equilibria with a single mass point of consumers will be unaffected by increasing the 
number of firms but the case of n mass points will be less likely to support a subgame 
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies the greater is n for the same reasons as in the 
two firm case when the mass points are too close together.   
Hotelling’s paper closes with a lament of conformity triggered by minimal 
differentiation: “[o]ur cities become uneconomically large and the business districts 
within them are too concentrated.  Methodist and Presbyterian churches are too much 
alike; cider is too homogeneous.”  We close with the observation that at least the cider 
is likely to be cheap. 
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Appendix 
Pure strategy equilibria in the price-setting subgame 
First, suppose consumers are at two distinct mass points on [0,1] where, without loss 
of generality, c1<c2.  Labelling the firms’ locations such that f1<f2 we have six 
possible arrays of locations which we discuss in order.  Throughout we use the 
notation that sij=|fi-cj| denotes the distance from firm i to consumer mass point j and 
we let the density of consumers at point ci be Li, i=1,2, where L1+L2=L.  Let pi* 
denote the money price charged by firm i such that the full price at ci is v; that is, it is 
the local monopoly price for a firm to its ‘own’ consumers.  Finally, by way of a tie-
breaker, suppose that, if a firm is indifferent between charging a price that serves only 
its “own” consumers and charging a lower price that captures the entire market, then 
it will choose the former. 
(1) f1<c1<c2<f2.  Suppose firm 1 charges p1*.  If firm 2 charges p2*=v-ts22 then it will 
earn profits of L2(v-ts22) because, with pi=pi* and c2>c1 each will sell only to its own 
market and pi* is its optimal price.  Alternatively, firm 2 might levy a price that 
catches the entire market – this requires a price just less than or equal to (the latter iff 
s21≤s11) p2′=v-ts21 – in which case its profit is Lp2′≅L(v-ts21). 
 Diagrammatically, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 c1 c2
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 s22 s11
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|slope| = t
$ 
L1 
L2 
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p2′ 
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So p2* is a best response to p1* iff L(v-ts21)≤L2(v-ts22) i.e. iff. ( )( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤  
Intuitively, firm 2 is more tempted to undercut firm 1 and serve the whole market the 
greater is the density of consumers at c1 relative to that at c2, the closer are the two 
consumer locations (the smaller is s21-s22) and the greater is the surplus to be had from 
consumers at c1 (the greater is v-ts21.)  By symmetry, p1* is a best response to p2* iff  
( )
( )12
1112
1
2
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤ .   
 But if firm 2 sets p2′ then firm 1 makes zero profit and p1* is not a best 
response.  Firm 1’s best response is to undercut 2’s full price at c1 by epsilon (or, if a 
similar calculation to that done above for firm 2 also holds for firm 1, to set p1 such 
that firm 1 serves the whole market) to which 2’s best response is a slightly lower 
price and so on and so forth.  This argument applies until one of two cases occurs. 
First, firm i’s price is sufficiently low that firm j makes greater profit by giving up on 
serving the whole market, increasing its price and serving only its own consumers.  In 
such a case firm i would also wish to raise its price to just undercut firm j and the 
argument repeats; we have no equilibrium in pure strategies.  Second, firm i’s price 
goes to zero but firm j still finds it more profitable to serve the whole market than just 
its own consumers (at a higher price).  This case will arise where sii is so great 
compared to sji that firm j can capture the whole market even when pi=0 and make 
higher profits than serving only cj at pj*.  When pi=0 consumers at ci pay tsii to buy 
from firm i and so will purchase from firm j at pj+tsji so long as pj+tsji≤tsii i.e. so long 
as pj≤t(sii-sji).  In such a case pi≥0 and pj=t(sii-sji) constitute an equilibrium if πj=tL(sii-
sji)>Lj(v-tsjj). 
 In sum, when f1<c1<c2<f2 we either get an equilibrium in which pi=pi* and 
each firm is a local monopoly to its own consumers only or an equilibrium in which 
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one firm sets any price, even 0, and the other captures the entire market, or we get no 
equilibrium at all. 
 
(2) f1<c1<f2<c2.  Suppose first that s21<s22 i.e. firm 2 is closer to c1 than it is to c2. In 
this case, any p2 that yields positive surplus to consumers at c2 will also yield positive 
surplus to consumers at c1 and firm 1 will wish to undercut by epsilon in order to 
capture c1.  The argument made in case (1) above then applies here and we are left 
with either an equilibrium in which firm 1 sets a price of 0 and firm 2 captures the 
entire market or we get no equilibrium at all. So consider instead the case where 
s21>s22 i.e. firm 2 is closer to c2 than it is to c1.  By reasoning similar to that above, we 
can sustain pi=pi* as an equilibrium iff the profits to firm 2 from capturing the entire 
market are less than those from setting p2* in response to p1* and this occurs, as 
before, iff ( )( )21 2212 21
t s sL
L v ts
−< − .  In sum, when f1<c1<f2<c2 we again either get an 
equilibrium in which pi=pi* and each firm is a local monopoly to its own consumers 
only or an equilibrium in which one firm sets any price, even 0, and the other captures 
the entire market, or we get no equilibrium at all. 
 
(3) f1<f2<c1<c2.  Now firm 2 is closer to all consumers than is firm 1 and firm 1 will 
make zero profit if it does not undercut any p2.  Accordingly, the only equilibrium is 
that p1=0 and firm 2 sets either the identical full price, p2=t(s11-s21) or, if f1 is 
sufficiently distant (if s11>v/t), then either p2=v-ts22 (if the full market is served) or 
p2=v-ts21 if firm 2 serves only its own consumers ( which will occur if c1 and c2 are 
sufficiently far apart.)  Thus π1=0 and π2=Lt(s11-s21) or π2=max{L(v-ts22), L1(v-ts21)}. 
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(4) c1<f1<c2<f2.  As in case (2) above, firm 1 must be closer to c1 than to c2.  By 
reasoning that should now be familiar, we can sustain pi=pi* as an equilibrium iff. 
( )
( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤  
(5) c1<f1<f2<c2.  Again we need each firm to be closer to its own consumers than it is 
to the other consumers for an equilibrium to exist and, by our usual reasoning, we can 
sustain pi=pi* as an equilibrium iff 
( )
( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤ .   
(6) c1<c2<f1<f2.  As in case (3) above, with both firms to one side of all consumers, 
the only equilibrium is that p2=0 and firm 1 sets either the identical full price, 
p1=t(s22-s12) or, if f2 is sufficiently distant (if s22>v/t),  then either p1=v-ts11 (if the full 
market is served) or p1=v-ts12 if firm 1 serves only consumers at c2 ( which will occur 
if c1 and c2 are sufficiently far apart.)  Thus π2=0 and π1=Lt(s22-s12) or π1=max{L(v-
ts11), L2(v-ts12)}. 
 
Second, suppose consumers are all at one mass point.  If one firm i is 
sufficiently distant that si>v/t where si≡|c-fi| and c denotes the location of all the 
consumers, then clearly the only equilibrium is that pj=v-tsj, πi=0 and πj=L(v-tsj):  
one firm is too distant to compete, even at a zero money price, and the other captures 
the entire market and extracts all surplus.  If si>v/t for i=1,2, however, then price 
competition will drive the price of the most distant firm down to zero and the closest 
firm will match the full price and capture the entire market.  That is, if 0≤sj<si then 
pi≥0 and pj=t(si-sj) so πi=0 and πj=Lt(si-sj).  Finally, if 0≤s1=s2 then equilibrium 
involves pi=0 and πi=0 for i=1,2.   
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Pure strategy equilibria in the location subgame 
First, again suppose consumers are at two distinct mass points on [0,1] and consider 
the six possible arrays of locations discussed above.   
(1) f1<c1<c2<f2.  We noted that p2* and p1* constitute a price-setting equilibrium iff  
( )
( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤  and ( )( )12
1112
1
2
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤ .  If this fails then either there is no price 
equilibrium in pure strategies or, if πj=tL(sii-sji)>Lj(v-tsjj), then pi≥0 and pj=t(sii-sji) 
constitute an equilibrium.  In the first of these cases, let si denote the location in [0,1] 
at which firm i is just indifferent between serving its own consumers and serving the 
entire market.   Note that the set of locations at which, say, firm 1 will not be tempted 
to serve the entire market, is [0,s1], a closed set.  Note too that in that set 
πi=Lipi*=Li(v-tsii) so each firm’s profit is increased by moving closer to its consumers 
– reducing sii, subject to the caveat that it does not get so close to the rival as to induce 
non-equilibrium in the price subgame i.e. get beyond si.  Accordingly, because of this 
caveat, equilibrium locations either involve fi=ci, i=1,2 where s1>c1 or s2<c2, or fi=si 
where s1≤c1 or s2≥c2.  Most significantly, our conditions for a price-setting 
equilibrium when the firms locate exactly at the consumer mass points become 
∆−
∆≤
tv
t
L
L
j
i where ∆ denotes c2-c1.  That is, the densities of consumers should not be 
“too different”, the mass points should not be “too close” and the reservation value 
should not be “too high”.12   Finally, in the other sort of equilibrium mentioned 
initially – where the distant firm sells nothing – it is clearly in the interests of such a 
firm to relocate closer to the consumers.  This takes us back into the case where both 
                                                 
12  Conditions for an equilibrium where the firms do not locate at the mass points are uninteresting as 
such equilibria will be ruled out in stage one of the overall game.   
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firms have positive sales and thus to the case just discussed.  Thus there is no 
locational equilibrium in which f1<c1<c2<f2 strictly. 
 (2) f1<c1<f2<c2.  Here we again either get an equilibrium in which pi=pi* and each 
firm is a local monopoly to its own consumers only or an equilibrium in which one 
firm sets a price of 0 and the other captures the entire market or we get no equilibrium 
at all.  In the first and second cases it is again true that a firm’s profits are increased 
by moving closer to its own consumers, for the same reasons as exposited in case (1): 
there is no locational equilibrium in which f1<c1<f2<c2 strictly. 
(3) f1<f2<c1<c2.  Now equilibrium involves p1≥0 and either p2=t(s11-s21) or, if f1 is 
sufficiently distant (if s11>v/t), then either p2=v-ts22 (if the full market is served) or 
p2=v-ts21 if firm 2 serves only its own consumers ( which will occur if c1 and c2 are 
sufficiently far apart.)  Thus π1=0 and π2=Lt(s11-s21) or π2=max{L(v-ts22), L1(v-ts21)}.  
Now firm 1’s location cannot be optimal – by leapfrogging firm 2 to locate closer to 
the consumers it can earn positive profits.  The argument then applies to firm 1 etc.; 
conclusion: there can be no locational equilibrium in which fi<fj<c1<c2.   
(4) c1<f1<c2<f2.  Here we can sustain pi=pi* as an equilibrium iff 
( )
( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤ and 
our reasoning from case (2) applies directly: there is no locational equilibrium in 
which c1<f1<c2<f2 strictly. 
(5) c1<f1<f2<c2.  Here we can sustain pi=pi* as an equilibrium iff 
( )
( )21
2221
2
1
tsv
sst
L
L
−
−≤ and 
again there is no locational equilibrium in which c1<f1<f2<c2strictly. 
(6) c1<c2<f1<f2.  As in case (3) above, with both firms to one side of all consumers, 
there can be no locational equilibrium in which c1<c2<f1<f2.   
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The only possible equilibria with two mass points of consumers, then, are (1) 
where fi=ci and pi=pi* which can only occur if the consumer densities and distances 
are such that ∆−
∆≤
tv
t
L
L
j
i  for i=1,2, and (2) where fi=si and at least one si≠ci. 
Second, suppose consumers are all at one mass point.  We make an important 
further ‘tie-breaker’ assumption that a firm with a number of alternative locations all 
yielding zero profit chooses the one that maximises its sales.  If one firm is too distant 
to compete, even at a zero money price, and the other captures the entire market and 
extracts all surplus then the distant firm can do better by moving closer to the 
consumers.  If locations are such that price competition drives the price of the most 
distant firm down to zero while the closest firm matches the full price and captures 
the entire market then again the distant firm can do better by moving closer to the 
consumers.  Finally, if the firms are equi-distant from the consumers, and so making 
zero profits, a firm is better moving in closer and earning positive profits.  In 
conclusion, the only equilibrium to the location game is that each firm locates at the 
same point as the consumers, sets pi=0 and earns πi=0.   
 
